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This page summarizes the boundary documented in the Sage repository’s docs/SECURITY_AND_DATA_HANDLING.md. When this page and the repository document disagree, the repository document is authoritative.

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The control-plane boundary

  • Sage may use Mythic and BloodHound control-plane data: callbacks, tasks, files, credentials, graph facts.
  • All target-facing interaction executes as Mythic tasks on live payload callbacks. Sage never connects directly to target LDAP, SMB, Kerberos, WinRM, RPC, HTTP, or equivalent services, and Sage-local attack artifacts are not compromise proof.

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Evidence rules

  • Runtime effects and objective completion require Mythic task output or artifacts, Mythic credential-store state, or BloodHound facts derived from payload-collected artifacts.
  • Self-reported success is not proof. The engagement ledger records a hop as achieved only with a valid proof envelope.

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Data handling

  • Do not put secrets in scripts, skills, logs, or public artifacts. read_credentials can place raw secrets in model context and traces; use it deliberately.
  • Retained identity and membership observations are shared across assisted chats in the same Mythic operation engagement and persist across Sage restarts. /report shows what has been retained; a reported identity or host membership does not prove current authentication or access.
  • The optional Slack hook emits only a fixed generic change notice: never operation, finding, host, user, domain, credential, task, or file values. Full findings stay in native Mythic chat inside your trusted deployment.
Authorized use only. These sections describe how Sage is built to behave, not a permission to operate Sage against anything. Every action Sage takes must fall inside activity you are explicitly authorized to perform.